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1. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 7 (1980).  My
indebtedness to this treatise is apparent throughout.
2. Id. at 451.  The authors impose an individualistic perspective on the meaning of this “core value.”
They write: “[R]espect is defined as an interrelation among individual human beings in which they
reciprocally recognize and honor each other’s freedom of choice about participation in the value processes
of the world community or any of its component parts.”  Id. (emphasis added).  No explanation or
justification is given for this individualistic skew, however.  And just as well.  I see no reason why this
otherwise useful definition of the value of respect cannot and should not apply to groups of human beings
as well as to individual members of the human family.  Indeed, a more inclusive definition, even one that
extends to animate and inanimate nature, is more in keeping with the very idea of human rights, certainly
of universal human rights.  
3. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://search.eb.com/eb/
article-219325 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).  Reconsidering this phrase, I am today inclined to add
“capability” to “merit” (and possibly also “basic need” insofar as it is not a function of “capability”) as
potentially a permissible basis for discrimination in otherwise equal arenas of claim and decision. 
4. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATION-BUILDING IN
CROSS-CULTURAL SETTINGS*
Burns H. Weston**
I.  DELIMITATION OF THE PROBLEM
Values are preferred events, “goods” we cherish; and the value of respect,
“conceived as the reciprocal honoring of freedom of choice about participation in value
processes,”1 is “the core value of human rights.”2  In a world of diverse cultural
traditions that is simultaneously distinguished by the widespread universalist claim that
“human rights extend in theory to every person on earth without discriminations
irrelevant to merit,”3 the question thus unavoidably arises: when, in human rights
decision-making, are cultural differences to be respected and when are they not?  The
question arises early in the nation-building enterprise where demands to preserve
cultural traditions clash with demands to adhere to universal (and largely external)
human rights standards.
This question was perhaps most famously first posed internationally in the late
1980s when Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death threat against British novelist
Salman Rushdie for publication of The Satanic Verses4—and, as well, a fatwa to
suppress its distribution.  Outrage at this theocratic salvo, condemned by Western
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5. Thomas L. Friedman, Bush Finds Threat to Murder Author “Deeply Offensive,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1989, at A1 (quoting statement of President George H.W. Bush on the issue).  For equivalent comments
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community, including reference to “the universal
values of tolerance, freedom and respect for international law,” see Text of European Statement, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1989, at A8.
6. The practices—neither exhaustively nor altogether unambiguously stated—are listed in alphabetical
order according to the physical and behavioral dimensions of human existence.  The inner existential
(spiritual) dimension of human existence does not seem apt for separate categorization inasmuch as all
cultural practices for which relativist claims have been or might be made to appear to affect the human
psyche in some way, mental or psychological torture most directly of course.  
leaders as “deeply offensive to the norms of civilized behavior,”5 was duly recorded,
to be sure.  But a palpable hesitancy and timidity in its expression at the time,
discernible especially at the beginning of the episode, suggested a concern for more
than diplomatic niceties.  It suggested also a haunting uncertainty as to whether the
forceful advocacy of free conscience and speech was not simply giving voice to a set
of idiosyncratic biases of one’s own, neither wanted nor relevant in a faraway Islamic
land shaken by claimed apostasy.  Perhaps bedeviled by the absolute that there are few
if any moral absolutes, supposed universal human rights ran up against the variability
of a human culture.  
The Rushdie affair, however, is only one of a long history of occasions in which
the universal validity of moral judgments has been called into question.  Indeed, in
recent decades, the issue has jostled interstate relations even to the point of armed
conflict.  
The provocations, however, have been more nationally than internationally
situated, and preponderantly within countries of non-Western origin that emerged from
the dismantling of colonial empires after World War II and, later, the Cold War.  The
reasons are several and diverse, but separately and together they have signaled the
engagement of countries bent on “nation-building,” a mantra of geopolitical
consolidation that often has reflected one culture’s struggle for domination over
another. They are seen in conflicts stemming from territorial boundaries drawn by
erstwhile colonizers insensitive to cultural and ethnic fault lines; in governments intent
on erecting centralized control on the precarious scaffolding of peripheral loyalties; in
the fusion of church-state institutions and procedures that privilege “the chosen” at the
expense of “the other”; in the glorification of patrimonial and other traditions that serve
well the interests of power elites but poorly the interests of the powerless many; in the
mounting of barricades against political, economic, and—now increasingly—
environmental refugees perceived to threaten established economic and political order;
and so forth.  The following table lists many of the cultural practices well-known for
the cross-cultural controversies they can and often do generate in these settings.6  
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7. “Female genital cutting” (FGC) is a value-neutral term that I borrow from The New York Times and
other media to avoid the pre-judgment bias of “female genital mutilation” or “FGM.”  I choose the term in
lieu of “female genital surgery” because this latter implies a greater degree of precision and refinement in
the practice than I believe is empirically warranted overall.
Table of Physical and Behavioral Practices
Physical Practices
1. Abortion
a. Mandatory 
b. Permitted, prohibited
2. Cannibalism 
3. Corporal disfigurement
a. Foot binding
b. Genital cutting
(1) Male (e.g., circumcision)
(2) Female genital cutting
(FGC, a/k/a “FGM” and
“FGS”)7
c. Scarring, tattooing
4. Corporal punishment
a. Public (state imposed/sanctioned)
(1) Amputation
(2) Caning, flogging, lashing, 
spanking, whipping
(3) Death/Execution
(a) Electric chair
(b) Firing squad
(c) Hanging
(d) Lethal injection
(e) Stoning
b. Private (e.g., familial)
(1) Spanking, slapping,
whipping
(2) “Honor killing”
5. Euthanasia
6. Genocide, “ethnic cleansing”
7. Imprisonment
a.  Life
b.  Solitary
c. Hard labor
8. Infanticide
9. Torture (physical, mental)
Behavioral Practices
1.  Banishment, “ethnic cleansing,”
ostracization 
2.  Discrimination, segregation
a. Age
b. Caste/Class
c. Ethnicity
d. Gender, sexual orientation
e. Health (e.g., HIV, lepers)
f. Merit/Basic need
g. Nationality
h. Political opinion
i. Race
j. Religion
3. Divorce, separation
a. Unilateral
4. Dress codes
a. Body covering
b. Veil wearing
5. Marriage
a. Arranged child marriage
b. Bride price, dower
c. Forced marriage
d. Homosexual  
e. Polygamy/polygyny
6. Slavery, forced labor
7. State-sponsored deprivations 
a.  Civil/political deprivations
(1) Assembly, association
(2) Expression, opinion, speech
(3) Other
b. Economic/social deprivations
(1) Education
(2) Employment
(3) Other
7
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8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 16, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER: BASIC DOCUMENTS III.A.1 (Burns H. Weston & Jonathan C. Carlson eds., 1994)
[hereinafter 3 Weston & Carlson].
9. Id. art. 2. 
10. The term is borrowed from anthropology and moral philosophy.   For helpful explication, see
Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869, 885-88
(1985).  
11. See John F. G. Hannaford, Truth, Tradition, and Confrontation: A Theory of International Human
Rights, 31 CAN. Y. B. INT’L L. 151 (1993).  
Relativists make an argument of the following kind: for too long western civilization has
been obsessed with finding concrete and objective truths.  Yet no consensus has formed
around the various offerings.  This is so precisely because there have never been truths to
be found.  Therefore, we should recognize that there is no truth beyond ourselves and the
institutions we create; and, in admitting this, we should recognize the limitations of our
convictions.  
Id. at 152.
Further, the more global modernization unfolds and “culture contact” grows, the
more are such occasions—both within and between countries—likely to arise and
insist upon answers.  Consider, for example, the practices of child betrothal and fixed
marriage widespread in the Third World.  Sooner or later one must ponder Article 16
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaiming that “[m]en and
women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the
right to marry and found a family” and “only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses.”8  Similarly, sub-Saharan communitarian traditions that define
personal identity and status in terms of birthright, sex, age, and group membership, or
occasional Hindu and Muslim traditions that segregate women on a widespread basis
(Harem, Purdah), cause one to puzzle over the reach of the UDHR’s guarantees of
equality and nondiscrimination irrespective of “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”9 
Such illustrations of the possible non-universality of allegedly universal human
rights are of course many and in no way restricted to Third World settings.  The long-
standing resistance of the capitalist countries, particularly the United States, to
socioeconomic rights, and of the communist countries, past and present, to civil and
political rights, attest forcefully to this fact.  So too do the abortion and nuclear
weapons policies in the industrialized world, challenging the “right to life” set forth
in UDHR Article 3 just as do the practices of infanticide and  female sacrifice, (Sati,
for example) in “pre-modern” societies.  Add to the mix the disagreements that shadow
the very existence of some claimed universal human rights and, as well, their inter-
pretation and enforcement when not existentially challenged (for example the
prohibition of torture), and the argument of cultural relativism10—that there are no
overarching moral truths and that local customs and traditions therefore fundamentally
determine the existence and scope of rights in any given society11—may be seen to
loom large.
The issue remains with us today.  Since 1989 especially, when cultural
variabilities were freed from the silencing grip of Cold War loyalties, it has been
forcefully argued in several—particularly Asian—quarters that, as Pascal observed
some three centuries ago, what may be truth on one side of the Pyrenées may be error
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12. BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES 135 (Garnier-Flammarion 1976) (1897).
13. Anticipating this debate, see especially JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE  (1989) [hereinafter DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS]; HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979); RELATIVISM: INTER-
PRETATION AND CONFRONTATION (Michael Krausz ed., 1989); RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES
FOR THEORY AND ACTION (Smitu Kothari & Harsh Sethi eds., 1989) [hereinafter RETHINKING HUMAN
RIGHTS]; THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Weston & Marks]; Howard R. Berman, Are Human Rights Universal?, 17
INTERCULTURE 53 (1984); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS.
Q. 400 (1984) [hereinafter Donnelly, Cultural Relativism]; Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., Objections to Western
Conceptions of Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1981); Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of
Human Rights a Western Concept?, 120 DIOGENES 75 (1982); Tesón, supra note 10.
Among the many post-Cold War contributions to the debate should be noted at least the following:
REZA AFSHARI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: THE ABUSE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM (2001); JESSICA ALMQVIST,
HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVER-
SALITY IN PRACTICE (1999); LYNDA S. BELL ET AL., NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2001);
EVA BREMS, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY (2001); BRET L. BILLET, CULTURAL
RELATIVISM IN THE FACE OF THE WEST: THE PLIGHT OF WOMEN AND FEMALE CHILDREN (2007); DONALD
E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991); ROBERT PAUL CHURCHILL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
DIVERSITY (2005); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); YASH P. GHAI, UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
AS A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATING INTERETHNIC CLAIMS (2000); RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1995); HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES (Michael C. Davis ed.,
1995); HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL DIVERSITY (Simon Caney & Peter Jones eds., 2000); HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im ed., 1992);
HUMAN RIGHTS ON COMMON GROUNDS: THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY (Kirsten Hastrup ed., 2001);
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im & Francis M.
Deng eds., 1990);  AKIRA IRIYE, CULTURAL INTERNATIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER (1997); SARAL
JHINGRAN, ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND UNIVERSALISM (2001); SATISH KANITKAR, CULTURE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (2000); XIAORONG LI, ETHICS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURE: BEYOND RELATIVISM AND
UNIVERSALISM (2006); RUTH MACKLIN, AGAINST RELATIVISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND THE SEARCH
FOR ETHICAL UNIVERSALS IN MEDICINE (1999); CLAUDIA MOSCOVICI, DOUBLE DIALECTICS: BETWEEN
UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM IN ENLIGHTMENT AND POSTMODERN THOUGHT (2002); RODA MUSHKAT,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASIAN VALUES: LEGAL NORMS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES
(2004); CHANDRA MUZAFFAR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1993); RELIGION, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ISLAMIC STATE PRACTICES (Javaid
Rehman & Susan C. Breau eds., 2007); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990);  WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE
UNIVERSAL? (2005); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell
eds., 1999); UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL ORDER IN A DIVIDED WORLD (David A. Reidy &
Mortimer N.S. Sellers eds., 2005); CLAUDE EMERSON WELCH & VIRGINIA A. LEARY, ASIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1990); Larry Catá Backer, Human Rights and Legal Education in the Western
Hemisphere: Legal Parochialism and Hollow Universalism, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 115 (2002);
Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality, and the Future of Human Rights, in Weston
& Marks, supra, at 101; Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human
Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996); Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian
Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641 (1996); Amy
Small Bilyeu, Trokosi–The Practice of Sexual Slavery in Ghana: Religious and Cultural Freedom vs.
on the other (“Verité au-deça des Pyrenées, erreur au-delà”).12  In the wake of such
assertions, there ensued not a little debate among governmental officials, scholars, and
others about the extent to which, if at all, cultural particularities should be allowed to
determine the existence and scope of rights promised to individuals and groups by
universalist human rights instruments13 such as the UDHR,14 the International
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Human Rights, 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (1999); Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural
Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999); Ida L. Bostian, Cultural
Relativism in International War Crimes Prosecutions: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2005); Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740
(1994); Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and
Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998); Michele D’Avolio, Child Labor and Cultural Relativism:
From 19th Century America to 21st Century Nepal, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 109 (2004); Jack Donnelly, The
Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 281 (2007); Paul Dubinsky, What is Human
Right? Universals and the Challenge of Cultural Relativism, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 107 (1999); Richard
Falk, False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion: The Case of Islam,  18 THIRD WORLD Q. 7
(1997);  Jeremy Firestone et al., Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, and the Emergence of Indigenous
Peoples in International and Comparative Environmental Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 219 (2005);
Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Cultural Relativism and Universal Rights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 9, 1995,
at B1; Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 593 (1997); Yash
Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 AUSTL. Y. B. INT’L L. 1 (1994); Michael
Goodhart, Origins and Universality in the Human Rights Debates: Cultural Essentialism and the
Challenge of Globalization, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 935 (2003); Hannaford, supra note 11; Sonia Harris-Short,
International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 130 (2003); Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity,
Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR
CONSENSUS 81 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im ed., 1992); Vedna Jivan & Christine Forster, What Would
Gandhi Say? Reconciling Universalism, Cultural Relativism and Feminism Through Women’s Use of
CEDAW, 9 S.Y.B.I.L. 103 (2005); Bilahari Kausikan, Asia’s Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL’Y 24
(1993); Bilahari Kausikan, An  Asian Approach to Human Rights, 89 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 152
(1995); Kim dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 189; Richard Klein, Cultural
Relativism, Economic Development and International Human Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TOURO INT’L
L. REV. 1 (2001); Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human
Rights Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689 (2004); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal vs. Islamic Human Rights:
A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307 (1994); Celestine I. Nyamu,
How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy
in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381 (2000); Dianne Otto, Rethinking the “Universality”
of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious
Freedom? The Universality of Human Rights, The Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
385 (2005); Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism, Universalism and the Claims of Democracy, in GENDER
JUSTICE, DEVELOPMENT AND RIGHTS (Maxine Molyneux & Shahra Razavi eds., 2002); Adamantia Pollis,
Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 316 (1996); Prabhakar, Values?
Whose Values?, GLOBAL TIMES, May 1996, at 14; Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in
International Human Rights Discourse, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (Julie Peters & Andrea
Wolper eds., 1995); Alison Dundes Renteln, A Cross-Cultural Approach to Validating International
Human Rights: The Case of Retribution Tied to Proportionality, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND
MEASUREMENT 7 (David Louis Cingranelli ed., 1988); Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Universalist
Controversy. A Response to Are the Principles of Human Rights “Western” Ideas? An Analysis of the
Claim of the “Asian” Concept of Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, by Dr. Surya P.
Subedi, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 71 (1999); Jennifer Schirmer, The Dilemma of Cultural Diversity and
Equivalency in Universal Human Rights Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTHROPOLOGY (Theodore
E. Downing & Gilbert Kirschner eds., 1998); Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal
Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527 (2001);
Torben Spaak, Moral Relativism and Human Rights, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73 (2007); James A.
Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the
Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459 (2005); Leigh A. Trueblood, Female Genital Mutilation:
A Discussion of International Human Rights Instruments, Cultural Sovereignty and Dominance Theory,
28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437 (2000); Jiangyu Wang, China and the Universal Human Rights
Standards, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 135 (2001); George Weigel, Are Human Rights Still
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Universal?, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1995, at 43; Burns H. Weston, The Extension of Human Rights in a
Divided World, in LES DROITS DE L’HOMME: UNIVERSALITÉ ET REVOUVEAU: 1789-1989, 363 (Guy
Braibant & Gérard Marcou eds., 1990) [hereinafter Weston, Divided World]; Burns H. Weston, The
Universality of Human Rights in a Multicultured World: Toward Respectful Decision-Making in Weston
& Marks, supra, at 65; Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 109; Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and
Li Peng Don’t Understand About Asia, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 1997, at 33.
14. UDHR, supra note 8.
15. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR], reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967) and in 3 Weston & Carlson III.A.2, supra note 8.
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) and
in 3 Weston & Carlson III.A.3, supra note 8. 
17. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration], reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1661 and in 3 Weston & Carlson III.U.2, supra note 8.
18. Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference for Human Rights, Bangkok, Thailand, Apr.
7, 1993, Final Declaration, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59 [hereinafter Bangkok
Declaration], reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 370 (1993).  The Declaration was based heavily on a proposal
authored by China.  See Jin Yongjian, Asia’s Major Human Rights Concerns, 36 BEIJING REV. 10, 19-25
(1993). 
19. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 18, ¶ 30.
20. Id. ¶ 5.
21. Id. ¶ 8.
Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)15 and its companion
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)16 (together constituting
what has come to be called the “International Bill of Human Rights”).
The interplay between the landmark 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action,17 adopted by acclimation by 172 states at the UN World Conference on Human
Rights that produced it, and the provocatively relativist Bangkok Declaration that
emanated from the 1993 Regional Meeting of Asian and Pacific States preparatory to
the Vienna Conference,18 makes this debate clear.  The Bangkok Declaration, after
reaffirming in its preamble a “commitment to principles contained in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” stresses “the urgent
need to . . . ensure a positive, balanced and non-confrontational approach to addressing
and realizing all aspects of human rights”;19 emphasizes “the principles of respect for
national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal
affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pres-
sure”;20 and recognizes that “while human rights are universal in nature, they must be
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”21  In language renunciative but
reminiscent of this Bangkok Declaration, the 1993 Vienna Declaration provides:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.  The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.  While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic
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22. Vienna Declaration, supra note 17, ¶ 5.
23. Otto, supra note 13, at 11.  Cf. Hannaford, supra note 11, at 151.  
24. Otto, supra note 13, at 11.
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and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.22
This outcome, Australian human rights scholar Dianne Otto observed a few years later,
“can be read as supporting either the universalist or relativist position.”23  It “reflects
the paralysis of the debate,” she added, “and leaves the issue firmly on the
international human rights agenda for another day.”24  
I believe that Otto may have exaggerated the long-term impact of the relativist
position on the Vienna Declaration.  Judging from lectures, conferences, and symposia
honoring the fiftieth anniversary of the UDHR, however, she correctly concluded that
the relativist-universalist debate itself remains strong on the human rights agenda.25
A survey of the literature reveals that the vast majority of commentators choose
not an analytically neutral position but, rather, one that champions one side of the
debate or the other.  It also reveals that the greatest number—most of them
intellectually indebted or otherwise sympathetic to Western thought and tradition
(doubtless because they are the most likely to have ready access to relevant journals
and other current sources of information)—come down, not surprisingly, on the side
of universalism.  Cultural relativism, if it is not being criticized for preventing cross-
cultural moral judgments altogether, is repeatedly denounced as a new excuse for an
old strategy,26 used “to justify limitations on speech, subjugation of women, female
genital mutilation, amputation of limbs and other cruel punishment, arbitrary use of
power, and other violations of international human rights conventions.”27  Where once
the old Adam of territorial sovereignty served generally to prevent outside intervention
into “the domestic jurisdiction” such as might offset major abuse, now, in a world
where state sovereignty is becoming more and more porous, cultural relativism is seen
increasingly to substitute in this role.  In both the building and perpetuation of nations,
cultural relativism is invoked to prevent intranational and international judgments and
policies, both legal and moral, about genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, rape, and
other such acts of human violation whenever and wherever they occur.
Are these choices and conclusions unequivocally favoring universalism over
relativism legitimate?  In an objectively critical sense, I think not, though not because
they are the result of simplistic a priori reasoning or even that they are wrong.  To the
contrary, as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, relativism, as a normative thesis about
how we should make moral judgments, suffers from major conceptual problems of its
own making:
First, it has no bite in the modern world, where the ideas of every culture turn up
inside every other, through the internet and the media. . . .  Many forms of moral
relativism . . . use an unrealistic notion of culture.  They imagine homogeneity where
there is really diversity. . . .  Second, it is not obvious why we should think the
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normative relativist thesis true.  Why should we follow the local ideas, rather than the
best ideas we can find?  Finally, normative relativism is self-subverting: for, in asking
us to defer to local norms, it asks us to defer to norms that in most cases are strongly
nonrelativistic.  Most local traditions take themselves to be absolutely, not relatively,
true.  So in asking us to follow the local, relativism asks us not to follow relativism.28
Furthermore, sympathetic (Westerner) as I am to the expansion and invigoration of
universal human rights norms and practices, I am much taken by the idea that
universalist international human rights law can and should serve as a basis for
rendering cross-cultural normative judgments.  
My concern is that, without an analytically neutral approach for deciding when
cultural differences are to be respected and when not, pro-universalist choices and
conclusions undermine the credibility and defensibility of their own particularistic
objectives and thus make the idea of international human rights law as a basis for
rendering moral judgments very difficult, perhaps even unworkable on occasion.  One-
sided assertions of legitimacy and priority, which by definition discount the centrality
of the value of respect in human rights, invite countervailing charges of cultural
imperialism (defending against real or imagined claims of cultural superiority—
“colonizing”) and cultural ethnocentrism (defending against real or imagined claims
of cultural bias—“Westernizing”).  Accordingly, they defeat the core goals they seek
to achieve. True, cultural relativists also express themselves in ways that subvert their
own credo, for example, when non-Western and sometimes even Western proponents
of cultural pluralism evince absolutist outrage at the supposed moral decay of the
West.  But this is only to prove my point.  Any human rights orientation that is not
genuinely in support of the widest possible embrace of the value of respect in the
making and enforcement of human rights norms in a multicultured world is likely to
provoke widespread skepticism if not unreserved hostility. 
It is of course tempting to argue that international human rights law itself settles
the issue. In human rights convention after human rights convention, after all, states
have committed themselves to the universality of human rights, both regionally and
globally.  Therefore, given the rudimentary—indeed, foundational—international law
principle pacta sunt servanda, they are duty-bound to uphold that universality.  
This argument, however, falls woefully short of the cross-cultural challenge.
There are at least four reasons why.
First, not all states, certainly not all “relativist” states, have ratified even some of
the core international human rights instruments, thus thwarting the pacta sunt servanda
argument ab initio in many if not most instances of relativist-universalist contestation.
Furthermore, given that the vast majority of international human rights law is
conventional in kind (a powerful reminder of the resilience of the state sovereignty
principle despite its increasing permeability), the instances in which customary
international human rights law, binding on all states, may be said to apply, are
exceedingly rare.     
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Second, while many cultures share common values, much of international human
rights law, particularly as it relates to such “first generation” or “negative” rights as are
reflected in the ICCPR,29 may be said to be Western inspired,30 thus fueling the con-
flict rather than resolving it.31  That sometimes “[t]he universalist position completely
denies that the existing universal standards may themselves be culturally specific and
allied to dominant regimes of power”32 does not alter this fact.  So, when Jack
Donnelly writes that “[l]ife, social order, protection from arbitrary rule, prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment, the guarantee of a place in the life of the
community, and access to an equitable share of the means of subsistence are central
moral aspirations in nearly all cultures,”33 we must be careful to read him and other
keen observers like him precisely; the language of morality is not to be confused with
the language of law even though the former invariably shapes the latter and vice versa.
Third, all human rights instruments are filled with ambiguity and indeterminacy,
sometimes deliberately to ensure signature and ratification.  Thus they require
interpretation to inform the content of universalism even when the concept of it has
been accepted.34  When, for example, does a cultural practice—say, caning in
Singapore or death by electrocution, firing squad, hanging, or lethal injection in the
United States—run afoul of formal promises that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life”35 or “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment”?36  As Philip Allot reminds us, 
[i]n all societies governments have been reassured in their arrogance by the idea that,
if they are not proved actually to be violating the substance of particularized human
rights, if they can bring their willing and acting within the wording of this or that
formula with its lawyerly qualifications and exceptions, then they are doing well
enough.37
The current U.S. government claim that “waterboarding” does not constitute torture
comes to mind.
Finally, when their plenipotentiaries are not signing or voting for human rights
resolutions and treaties “as mere gestures for temporary public relations purposes,”38
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states, including those that profess the universality of human rights, typically hedge
their bets by resort to reservations, statements of understanding, and declarations so
as to ensure that certain practices deemed central to their legal or other cultural
traditions will not be rendered unlawful or otherwise anachronistic.  Observes eminent
Indian legal scholar Upendra Baxi: 
Any international human rights lawyer worth her or his calling knows the riot of
reservations, understandings, and declarations that parody the texts of universalistic
declarations.  The “fine print” of reservations usually cancels the “capital font” of
universality.  In this sense, claims concerning the universality of human rights
enunciations are diversionary, embodying the politics of, rather than for, human
rights.39
Formal commitments to the universality of particular human rights doctrines,
principles, and rules are thus commonly qualified by the operational codes of everyday
life.40
In sum, the invocation of international human rights law does not of itself settle
the relativist-universalist debate.  There is, consequently, no escaping the fact that
claims of cultural relativism demand and deserve thoughtful responses.  Given the
centrality of the value of respect in human rights, the onus is on the human rights
advocate to provide a reasoned and intelligent—respectful—response to them.
But how is this to be done in the particular case?  How do we reach the conclusion
that a particular claim of universalism should trump a competing claim of cultural
relativism or vice versa?  
The remainder of this Essay explores this question, detailing a methodology of
respect according to which competing relativist-universalist claims can be assessed
objectively and thereby hopefully escape allegations of cultural imperialism and
ethnocentrism, whether nationally or internationally charged.  I begin by delineating
what I believe to be the observational standpoint that, in the building as well as the
post-building management of states, is necessary to render human rights judgments
about particular cultural practices in cross-cultural settings in an objectively respectful
manner.  Next, I postulate the world public order goals that would likely result from
that observational standpoint.  I then outline the intellectual tasks—five in all—that
I believe are required to facilitate such goals.  Thereafter I conclude with an appraisal
and recommendation.  Be it noted, however, that I approach this multiple task with
humility, recognizing my own vulnerability to cultural bias at least insofar as I rely
upon analytical concepts that derive from my own culture to describe and assess
realities in others.
II.  DELINEATING THE OBJECTIVE OBSERVATIONAL STANDPOINT
The observational standpoint required to resolve a relativist-universalist contro-
versy in a genuinely respectful manner is, I believe, that of rational persons of diverse
identity (creed, gender, race, etc.) acting privately (not, for example, as state represen-
tatives) and in their personal self-interest relative to the policies or values they believe
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should define the world public order of which they are a part, but behind a “veil of
ignorance” as to the particular circumstances of their own personal condition within
that order.  Persons familiar with legal philosophy will recognize the influence of neo-
Kantian John Rawls.  The true principles of justice, Rawls argues, are those of
“fairness”—to wit, those that “free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental
terms of their association.”41  While a purely hypothetical starting point, this
intellectual device does greatly minimize, even if it does not eliminate altogether, the
influence of the biases and prejudices of the observer or decision-maker.42  The
assumption is of thinking men and women who, each in their private capacity in some
original social setting, but without knowledge of the details of their own physical and
social identity, freely choose a public order that is fair to all in its distribution of
benefits (rights) and burdens (duties) because, rationally contemplating their own self-
interests, they choose a public order that will not cause anyone, including of course
themselves, to be disadvantaged in the real world; they choose principles of
governance that are good for all, not simply for some or a few.  The result is a set of
public order value preferences that transcend parochial interest and selfish motive, a
map of basic values or blueprint of fundamental laws that can win the assent of persons
everywhere, and thereby facilitate respectful decision when it comes to legal and moral
judgments about particular cultural practices across national boundaries.
Is this proposed observational standpoint subject to criticism for being too
Western inspired, too individualistically oriented?  After all, Rawls comes from a long
tradition of discourse dating back to the Enlightenment that, at an earlier time of
flourishing, had no apparent conceptual difficulty in promoting rights and the rule of
law in the West while colonizing and subjugating much of the rest of the world.43  The
fact is that a subtext can be discerned here of rational (not spiritual) persons making
atomistic/deductive (not holistic/dialectic) choices in their individual (not group)
capacity and self-interest, unaware of the particularities of their idiosyncratic (not
general) situation in the world, including their potential for membership in some social
group. The skeptic might therefore contend that a Western/individualistic skew has
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been insinuated into the “initial position” decision-makers’ role.  By assuming
ignorance as to class, ethnicity, nationality, race, religion, tribe, sex, and other such
indicia of social position, and thus, it might be argued, ignorance as to actual member-
ship in a social group, we preclude the spiritual/dialectic or collectivist/ communitarian
person from participating in the evaluation of a cultural practice—and consequently
make the above-defined observational standpoint for cross-cultural decision-making
questionable at best.  
But this argument, I submit, misses an important point.  Merely because Rawls’
“initial position” decision-makers may be acting individually and behind a “veil of
ignorance” as to their actual positions does not mean that they are acting individually
and behind a “veil of ignorance” as to their potential positions.  As rational people,
they are capable of foreseeing the possibility that they will belong to social groups that
espouse spiritual/dialectic and collectivistic/communitarian as well as Western/
individualistic values, and that therefore they may belong to a public order that
embraces all of these community values.  The essential thrust of the observational
standpoint thus remains valid: the rational “initial position” decision-maker will
choose the world public order that will most guarantee the fairest distribution of
benefits (rights) and burdens (duties) among all social groups as well as all individuals
and thereby ensure that groups as well as individuals will benefit as much as possible
and suffer the least possible disadvantage.  
Of course, whatever one may conclude about the influence of Western
individualism upon the observational standpoint recommended here—the perspective
of free and rational persons acting in their own self-interest in an “initial position” of
equality behind a “veil of ignorance” as to the precise terms of their societal circum-
stance—the actual attainment of such an observational standpoint is most likely
impossible in the real world.  No social psychologist would vouchsafe a person’s
capacity, whether individualistically or collectivistically inclined, for complete
objectivity in legal and moral decision-making.  The legal realists long ago—and the
proponents of Critical Legal Studies more recently—certainly have taught us this.  
In any event, an observational standpoint that identifies more with the human
species as a whole than with the primacy of any of its individual or group parts
remains, at least for anyone committed to global justice, an ideal to be pursued even
if it is never to be fully realized.  Hence the observational standpoint recommended
here.  Absent the core value of respect at the center of all inquiry into the relativist-
universalist debate—which is to say objectivity, at a minimum—there will be no
extending human rights values of any kind without rancor, possibly even violence.
Needed is an objective guidepost for community-wide decision-making that will at
least facilitate a fair—just—public order in both individualistic and collectivistic or
communitarian terms.  As stated above, one-sided characterizations of legitimacy and
priority, by definition discounting the centrality of the value of respect in human rights,
are likely (over the long term at least) to undermine the moral credibility of their
proponents and the defensibility of their particularistic objectives.44
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III.  THE POSTULATION OF BASIC PUBLIC ORDER GOALS
So what map of basic values, what fundamental principles of decision-making,
should our “initial position” decision-makers choose to guide their cross-cultural
judgments about particular cultural practices?  If they are to be consistent with the
observational standpoint recommended above, such values or principles cannot
represent only the exclusive interests of a particular segment of the world community.
They must reflect, rather, an inclusive approach to humankind’s great diversity.
Rawls argues that his “initial position” decision-makers would choose two
“principles of justice,” each intuitively derived.  Rawls’ “First Principle” stipulates that
“[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a system of liberty for all”45 (essentially the value of
liberty).  His “Second Principle” enjoins that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are . . .  to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . .
and . . . attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity”46 (essentially the value of equality). Together these two principles
achieve—with help from a “Difference Principle” that compensates for comparative
disadvantages and a “Reconciliation Principle” that facilitates the common interest
when the values of liberty and equality clash—Rawls’ general conception of justice:
fairness to and for all.  A difficulty with Rawls’ argument, however, is that, as
explained below,47 cultural practices for which relativist claims have been or might be
made commonly reach beyond the values of liberty and equality that Rawls stresses.
Therefore, neither liberty nor equality are sufficient to serve adequately as the
exclusive determinants of relativist-universalist contests.
An alternative choice, emphasizing the postulation of empirically premised public
order goals in contradistinction to their intuitive derivation in the manner of Rawls, is,
as proposed by McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, “the greatest production and widest
possible distribution of all important values, with a high priority accorded persuasion
rather than coercion in such production and distribution.”48  The Yale scholars have
in mind “[t]he comprehensive set of goal values . . . which today are commonly
characterized as the basic values of human dignity or of a free society,”49 such as
“those [values] which have been bequeathed to us by all the great democratic
movements of humankind and which are being ever more insistently expressed in the
rising common demands and expectations of peoples everywhere.”50  The phrasing of
this choice, however, while appealing to a confirmed believer in the “free society” and
“great democratic movements,” betrays a distinct Western bias that appears to
prejudge the outcome of the very issues and policy concerns that often are at stake in
relativist-universalist controversies in the first place.51  Indeed, as evidenced by their
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invocation of the United Nations Charter, the UDHR,52 the two covenants born of the
UDHR,53 and “their host of ancillary expressions”54 to lend authoritative support to
their postulate, it seems clear that their bias, heavily favoring universalist international
human rights law (which, as observed above, cannot of itself settle the relativist-
universalist debate),55 is not just Western but also universalist, clearly not a neutral
posture in the relativist-universalist debate under scrutiny here.
Thus, a compromise is in order, drawing from both Rawls and McDougal,
Lasswell, and Chen.  The map of basic values or fundamental decision-making prin-
ciples that should guide national and transnational judgments about particular cultural
practices should be one that is both more expansive or inclusive than that proposed by
Rawls and, consistent with the observational standpoint from which they would be
postulated, simultaneously less vulnerable than the McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen
formulation to accusations of Western/universalist bias—ergo one chosen by Rawls’
“initial position” decision-makers that embraces the following self-interested
desiderata:
• the widest possible shaping and sharing of all the values of human dignity,
including but not limited to (political) liberty and (socioeconomic) equality,
• without discrimination of any kind save that of merit and basic need (for
example, physical/mental handicap, rank poverty) in many though not
necessarily all instances,
• consistent with the truism that in a world of finite possibility, “most assertions
of human rights . . . are qualified by the limitation that the rights of any
particular individual or group in any particular instance are restricted as much
as is necessary to secure the comparable rights of others and the aggregate
common interest.”56
It need here be added only that, in choosing this policy guide to respectful relativist-
universalist decision, our “initial position” decision-makers might substitute Martha
Nussbaum’s (and Amartya Sen’s) language of “capabilities”57 for the more commonly
used language of “rights”—for example, thinking upon all the values of human dignity
not in terms of abstract goals but in terms, rather, of the concrete measurable needs
that all people must have satisfied to fulfill at least the minimal requirements of human
dignity however defined.
IV. THE INTELLECTUAL TASKS OF RELATIVIST-UNIVERSALIST DECISION
It is tempting to argue that local practices that are indisputably destructive of the
values (or capabilities) of human dignity must be altogether rejected and that such
rejection should not be confused with disrespect for cultural differences or the
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principles of nonintervention and self-determination that afford them protection.  I
have in mind such policies and practices as genocide, ethnic cleansing, imposed
starvation, physical and mental torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and execution,
slavery, forced labor, and racial apartheid.  If they are not entirely without cultural
basis in the first place, the threshold question in all instances of relativist–universalist
decision-making, these policies and practices are now so widely condemned that they
no longer can be justified by any local custom or rationale. 
Or so it might be initially argued.  In an earlier essay, I took this starting position,
arguing that “[i]f  cultural relativism is to function in these and like instances it does
so only as a cloak for despotism, stripping international human rights law from all
expectation of assuring . . . ‘basic decencies.’”58  And I was not alone.59  These obser-
vations, intuitively reached, remain valid, in my view precisely because the practices
mentioned appear to be without cultural basis in the first place.  But without having
first subjected each of them to the intellectual tasks of policy-oriented inquiry for the
purpose of facilitating fully respectful decision when cross-cultural legal and moral
judgments are being rendered, they were intellectually premature.  It is, I believe,
incumbent upon fully respectful cross-cultural judgment to enter first upon all the
intellectual tasks that seem required when having to resolve, from an “initial position”
policy-oriented perspective, a particular relativist-universalist controversy: (1) the
clarification of community policies relevant to the specific cultural practice at issue;
(2) the description of past trends in decision relevant to that practice; (3) the analysis
of the factors affecting these decisional trends; (4) the projection of future trends in
decision relevant to the specific cultural practice in question; and (5) the invention and
evaluation of policy alternatives to that practice.  An analytical flow chart of these
relevant intellectual tasks looks as follows: 
Clarification of Community Policies
;
Description of Past Trends in Decision
;
Analysis of Factors Affecting Decision
;
Projection of Future Trends in Decision
;
Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
Although they are presented in a logically sequenced order here, they must be applied
configuratively (as the two-way arrows suggest) and not in isolation from one another,
each task informing and being informed by the others, to achieve as comprehensive
a contextual analysis as possible.  The goal is to test each of these dimensions of
policy-oriented inquiry for their ability to contribute to rational but respectful choice
in decision, and to obtain guidance in the development of national and international
community policy relative to the practices in question.  Of course, as already
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intimated, a preliminary issue is the threshold question of whether or not the practice
in question is a cultural practice as distinct from one that might be, say, idiosyncratic
to the particular governing elite involved.  If the latter, then the relativist-universalist
issue is by definition not implicated, and a decision about the practice may be taken
according to potentially different policy criteria.  If, however, the practice in question
can be properly denominated a cultural one, then it is incumbent upon us, from the
standpoint of our “initial position” decision-makers, to pursue the policy-oriented
inquiry outlined.
A.  Clarification of Community Policies
At the outset of this Essay, I listed, according to human life’s physical and
behavioral dimensions, as many cultural practices as I can think of that are well known
for the cross-cultural controversies they generate or might generate.60   The policy
issue most fundamentally underlying each of these two existential categories concerns
the intensity and scope of power being exercised—more precisely, the necessity of the
intensity and scope of power being exercised—by one group of people (public or
private) in relation to another in the administration of the practice in question.  This
comes as no surprise, of course, because it is alleged abuses or excesses of power that
characterize most if not all human rights controversies.
Spanning these two existential categories, however, are at least two other
dimensions of human experience that merit attention.  They hint at still more precise
ways of identifying at least the principal policies that are at stake when cross-cultural
normative judgments are being attempted: the societal functions of (1) punishment and
(2) social differentiation.61  
Regarding punitive practices, relativist-universalist disagreement centers
essentially on the severity of the punishment in question or, alternatively, its propor-
tionality vis-à-vis the alleged precipitating social transgression.  Which is to say that
it centers on the community policies that regulate resort to coercion in the administra-
tion of cultural practices.  
Regarding socially differentiating practices, relativist-universalist disagreement
centers mainly on the justification given for the differentiation in question, and thus
on community policies that regulate the legal and moral rationales of cultural
administration.  Significantly, these policies tend to be gender-based and favoring men
over women (patriarchy) in many if not most instances. Women’s issues lie at the heart
of many relativist-universalist controversies, both directly and indirectly, particularly
at the intersection between masculine hegemony and women’s sexual and reproductive
identities.  As feminist scholar Arati Rao has observed, “[n]o social group has suffered
greater violation of its human rights in the name of culture than women.”62           
From a policy-clarifying standpoint, some of these practices are less easily
diagnosed than others.  Exceedingly difficult, for example, even though obviously
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involving power relationships, is the matter of abortion.  This is so not because of the
emotional politics that surround the practice (in the United States at least).  Rather, it
is because, central to the issue of abortion, there is fundamental disagreement on what
it means to be human, ergo fundamental disagreement on whether it is the human
rights of the fetus that are at stake (the right to life, the “pro-life” position) or the
human rights of the mother (the right to liberty, the “pro-choice” position).  Adding
to the complexity is the matter of mandatory or forced abortion as a function of
population control.  It is likely that both “pro-life” and “pro-choice” proponents would
agree that forcing a woman to have an abortion without her consent is a clear violation
of human rights—but whose human rights, espoused by whom? 
Also complicating policy clarification are the competing philosophical traditions
of individualism (liberty) and collectivism/communitarianism (equality) that, as
already intimated,  have greatly influenced at least Western moral thought and action
throughout most of the last two to three centuries.  Typically they are invoked to
prioritize civil and political (“first generation” or “negative”) rights, on the one hand,
or economic and social (“second generation” or “positive”) rights, on the other, even
to the complete denial of one generation in favor of the other, thus to the disregard of
the fundamental indivisibility that exists between each.  But they serve also to
rationalize most, perhaps even all, the physical and behavioral practices that have
proved controversial in the cross-cultural setting.  Exalting liberty and equality to the
disregard of other principles or values, they have diverted responsible attention from
the centrality of respect in human rights decision-making and thus thwarted clear-
headed thinking about the relativist-universalist choice. 
Consider, for example, a cultural practice that privileges one group of people over
another.  As such, it contradicts the collectivist/communitarian value of equality (as
commonly understood to mean the same measure/quantity or privilege/status as
another) and therefore, a fortiori, such human rights (individual or group) as are
premised on the value of equality.  If, then, equality as commonly understood is to
serve as our policy guide (a not unreasonable universalist inference given the
egalitarian content of the world’s existing human rights instruments),63 it follows that
relativist defenses of the practice must be rejected.  All of which will seem reasonable
enough if the local differentiation is based on, for example, gender or race, and we
shun gender- or race-based discrimination or segregation as incompatible with
equality.  But what if it is based on, say, age, basic need, capability, or merit?  What
decision then?  The point is, of course, that the answer is not self-evident from the
standpoint of equality.  Notions of equality do not of themselves provide a reliable exit
from the relativist-universalist conundrum.  Caught up in a swirl of normative
tautology in which we find ourselves providing answers according to the very
questions that are at issue in the first place, we are not any closer to the objective
understanding we seek.  For this reason we must be guided by something else.
Similar confusion sometimes accompanies the cross-cultural assessment of
physical practices, at least in theory.  Consider, for example, the Islamic (Qisas)
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practice of hand amputation for thievery in formerly theocratic Afghanistan and
imprisonment for thievery in the secular United States.  Clearly each practice
contradicts the individualist value of liberty (as commonly understood to mean the
condition of being free from restriction and especially governmental control).  But
given the widespread acceptance of deprivations of liberty for socially deviant
behavior, surely it is not this contradiction or infringement that inclines us to reject a
relativist defense of the theocratic culture in the first instance, nor to accept a relativist
defense (depending on other variables) vis-à-vis the secular culture in the second
instance.  The issue here is not whether liberty may be infringed, but, as earlier
suggested, to what extent, in what proportion.  Just as notions of equality do not of
themselves provide a reliable exit from the relativist-universalist conundrum, neither
do notions of liberty.  Again we must be guided by something else.
This “something else,” this guide to respectful decision, is, of course, that map of
basic values or fundamental principles of decision-making that our hypothetical “initial
position” decision-makers would choose behind a “veil of ignorance”  to ensure the
greatest possible equal distribution of benefits (rights) and burdens (duties) within the
public order of which they are a part—to wit, all the values (or capabilities) of human
dignity postulated to be appropriate and necessary for national and transnational
judgments about particular cultural practices.  Only by relating these broad postulated
goals to specific instances of relativist-universalist controversy—for example, hand
amputation in Afghanistan or outright execution in the United States—will it be
possible to ensure respectful decision about the competing values of cultural pluralism,
on the one hand, and of universalist principle, on the other.  True, the task of relating
these broad goals to specific cultural practices is no easy one.  Nor is it made easier
by the fact that, behind the relativist-universalist debate and evident on both sides of
it (particularly evident in the “Asian values” controversy), there lurks a desire less to
ensure cultural pluralism than to further the interests of the private and public
governing elites who, in the post-Cold War phenomenon we inadequately call
“globalization,” are engaged in a grand struggle for local-to-global economic and
political influence.  This hidden or unstated agenda, it must be added,  requires utmost
vigilance when judging cross-cultural human rights controversies.  To the dishonor of
those who pursue it, it commonly reflects a shameful disregard of the “Other”—the
“huddled masses, yearning to breathe free”64—who typically are the victims of
globalization’s highly uneven, indeed unjust, distribution of economic benefits and
burdens65 and whose pain always must be central to human rights discourse and
action.66   The relativist-universalist debate is not merely a conflict between differing
cultural and universal norms; it is in many ways a high-level confrontation between
competing conservative and liberal versions of capitalism, none of which is a priori
superior to the other, especially when expressed in cultural terms.  Neither the
2008] HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL SETTINGS 337
relativist nor the universalist thus may dismiss the other’s claims without a reasoned
response.  The policies that underwrite their claims must be understood for what they
are, and they must be properly measured for their compatibility with the wider public
order goals that our neutral “initial position” decision-makers would have chosen to
ensure respectful decision when rendering cross-cultural moral judgments. 
B.  Description of Past Trends in Cross-Cultural Decision
A key task in cross-cultural decision-making is to describe past trends in decision
relevant to the particular cross-cultural controversy.  An understanding of past cross-
cultural decision can reveal the extent to which a community, from local to global, has
actively denounced/supported, passively opposed/tolerated, or otherwise disapproved/
condoned the particular practice across space and time, and thereby reveal the extent
to which one should or should not take serious objection to it.  The essentially passive
official response to the caning of a young U.S. national for adjudged vandalism in
Singapore in the mid-1990s, for example, might usefully be examined from this
perspective.  In addition, assuming a desire to repeal or reform a local practice in
keeping with some universalist perspective, past trends can instruct us on the cross-
cultural difficulties that are likely to be encountered when subjecting provisional
formulations of the desirable to the discipline of the possible; they encourage
sensitivity to the potential for excessively burdensome demands for change, a
particularly important concern when developing countries engaged in nation-building
are involved.  Our concern, it bears re-emphasizing, is the tension between the core
value of respect, on the one hand, and all other values (or capabilities) that may be
espoused in any particular relativist-universalist controversy, on the other hand, and
our policy challenge is to figure out how to reconcile this tension objectively, how to
promote and protect the values (or capabilities) that reflect the unity of human
aspiration and, simultaneously, cultural diversity.
C.  Analysis of Factors Affecting Cross-Cultural Decision
Next it is important to analyze the factors that have influenced decisional trends
and thus also the case at hand.  It is important because such analysis helps us to
understand not only how and why relevant precedents were reached but also what
factors are likely to serve as useful indicators for present and future decisions,
particularly as they may prove useful in guiding our evaluation and recommendation
of policy alternatives.  The following conditioning factors, derived from the compound
question of who does what to whom, why, when and where, with what capabilities,
how, and with what short- and long-term results, constitute the principal elements of
social process.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that they have shaped cross-
culturally controversial practices in the past and that for this reason, whenever a
particular cultural practice is challenged by universalist principle, it is logical that they
be accounted for in the present and future.  Respectful decision-making in this realm
demands as much.  Only by asking such contextually oriented questions is a truly
objective decision-maker likely to be able to sift fact from fiction and cause from
consequence so as to permit sharp delineation of the critical public order policies that
are at stake and thereby acquire the comprehensive understanding of a given cultural
practice that is necessary to reach a respectful decision about it.  The following
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impressionistic forays, by no means exhaustive, should help to clarify what I have in
mind—understanding that it is seldom the investigation of one conditioning factor
alone but, rather, the in-depth exploration of all of them both severally and jointly that
is going to provide the cumulative, comprehensive knowledge that is needed to
achieve the respectful decision that is our objective.
1.  Participants
In all cultural practices, individual human beings are the ultimate actors, either
because they are themselves the masters of the practice or its servants, or because they
are affiliated with a group that is either way directly involved.67  If only just to
comprehend the practice, therefore, it is important to ask, as an anthropologist or
historian might do, such descriptively-oriented questions as: Who are the key
participants in the practice?  Who is responsible for the practice, who are its principal
masters?  Who is the object of it, who are its primary servants?  What biological char-
acteristics (race, sex, age, sexual orientation), culture (ethnicity, nationality), class
(wealth, power), interest (group membership), or personality (authoritarian, sub-
missive) may be attributed to each?  And so forth.  But participatory questions such
as these, helping us to understand the identity and roles of the different participants
involved, also greatly assist the issue of whether or not to honor a cultural practice,
particularly where the resolution of that issue turns on the legal and moral rationales
given for social differentiation.  Indeed, together with other considerations, they may,
in such instances, prove decisive in the given case.  
Consider, for example, the practice of racial apartheid in pre-1990 South Africa.
In addition to violating our general “initial position” postulate of nondiscrimination
in the shaping and sharing of all values, the fact that it privileged minority whites of
European origin over majority blacks of indigenous origin obviously had much to do
with the world’s having outlawed it.  Might similar conclusions be reached vis-à-vis
the Hindu and Muslim traditions in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East of
segregating women (Harem, Purdah)?  Of veil wearing  (Chador, Hijab, Niqab) and
total body covering (per the Shari’a doctrine of Urf)?  Of the erstwhile Chinese
practice of female foot binding were it still exercised today?  
In light of our nondiscrimination postulate, surely the participatory (patriarchal)
dynamics of such practices (privileging men over women) are important, sometimes
perhaps even decisive, to the issue of whether they should or should not be honored
in cross-cultural judgment.  If the practice involves a broad cross-section of society
participating in decision-making about it, including its servants as well as its masters,
we might tentatively conclude that the practice has at least some prima facie
legitimacy.  If, on the other hand, only privileged persons make the relevant decisions
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about it, we would apply, in light of  the postulated public order goal values of our
“initial position” decision-makers, a higher level of scrutiny to the cultural practice.
Likewise, if only one group benefits—particularly if the benefit is at the expense of
another group or if only one group “loses”—the practice, according to the same
criteria, should be called into question.
2.  Perspectives
Individuals and groups who participate in cultural practices bring with them
predispositional variables or perspectives—objectives (value demands), identities (for
whom values are demanded), and expectations (about the fulfillment or nonfulfillment
of demanded values)—which, together with environmental factors, affect cross-
cultural judgment about the legitimacy of a given practice from the standpoint of our
“initial position” decision-makers.  Those objectives and perspectives, be they of the
masters or the servants of the cultural practice in question, are important in the
relativist-universalist judgmental setting as well: What are the objectives, identities,
and expectations of the master(s) of the practice? The servant(s)?  To what extent do
the former affect the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of the latter and vice versa?  Are the
perspectives of the master(s) constructive and expansionist, believed to increase
aggregate values for all, or are they defensive, intended to protect the existing values
of exclusive groups?  Are the perspectives of the servant(s) opposed to the given
practice, or are they in support of it?  Does the master of a given practice seek power,
wealth, or some other value at the expense of the servant?  Does the servant willingly
acquiesce to such demands?  Unwillingly?  Do the identities of the participants relate
to the common interest of all members of the culture or only to the interests of a few?
Do all or some of the participants, masters and servants alike, perceive an intrinsic
value in fulfilling one’s role in the cultural practice?  If so, which ones?  Are they
conditioned to personal/social security or insecurity as part of their daily routine?
Consider in these lights the death threat and literary suppression imposed by Iran’s
theocratic government upon Salman Rushdie for his Shiite apostasy, claimed necessary
for the promotion and protection of religious rectitude.  Consider also the imposition
of the death penalty in the United States, professedly to deter crime and otherwise
promote civic virtue.
It is of course not only the express or stated perspectives of the participants that
must be taken into account.  As events in the Balkans and in Africa bear witness, such
inherent or quasi-inherent identities as ethnicity, race, color, sex, religion, political or
other opinion, language, nationality, age, and life-style are commonly the victims of
policies officially proclaimed and justified by their masters on the grounds of, but
bearing no real relation to, capability or merit.  An example from United States history
is the closing of public nursing homes and swimming pools allegedly for economic
reasons or concerns for public safety or health, when the real objective was to deny
access to minorities.68  Similarly, in a world where processes of socialization
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commonly promote the internalization and toleration of patterns of inequality and, in
so doing, subordinate the objectives, identities, and expectations of the servants of
cultural practices to the demands of those who enforce them, it is of utmost importance
to question the extent to which acquiescence to the given practice in issue is freely
given.  While by no means the exclusive determinant of cross-cultural judgment, it is
in this light that one should assess, for example, the female dress codes of veil wearing
(Chador, Hijab, Niqab) and total body covering (per the Shari’a doctrine of Urf) in
certain Islamic societies; likewise the tradition of arranged child betrothal in South
Asia and elsewhere.  In such cases, if we are to be consistent with the postulated public
order goals of our “initial position” decision-makers, a high level of scrutiny is
warranted.
3.  Situations
Spatial, temporal, institutional, and crisis-level features of social process also set
the parameters within which cultural practices must be judged.  Is the practice
confined to a single country or subnational unit or does it extend across national
frontiers to embrace whole regions or continents?  Is it of long-standing or short
duration, sporadic or continuous, thriving or dying out?  Does it operate exclusively
in the private sphere—say, as part of the institution of the nuclear family or clan—or
is it initiated and/or sanctioned by governmental, religious, or other institutions of
national scope and sway?  Is it a function of emergency situations or is it an everyday
organic occurrence?  Consider in these lights, for example, resort to the death penalty
in the United States; female genital cutting (FGC)69 outlawed in Egypt a short while
ago70 and reportedly on the decline in Kenya and the Côte d'Ivoire;71  female “honor
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killings” in Jordan (to protect one’s family’s reputation)  in violation of Jordanian
public policy;72 and the curtailment of civil liberties in the presence of civil conflicts
or in the wake of  national disasters.  If the practice extends broadly geographically,
or has been around for centuries or is growing in use, or is sponsored or actively
supported by national governmental or religious institutions, or is a function of normal
everyday life, might it not deserve at least prima facie deference?  By the same token,
if it is geographically confined, relatively new or dying out, carried out without
church/state participation or approval, and/or implemented only or mainly during
“manufactured crises,” surely greater skepticism regarding claims of “cultural
tradition” would be warranted.  Guiding our assessment of the answers to these
questions are, of course, the public order goals postulated by our “initial position”
decision-makers.
4.  Bases of Power
Potentially, all values (the “welfare values” of wealth, well-being, skills, and
enlightenment; the “deference values” of power, respect, rectitude, and affection)73
may be, alone or in combination, bases of power to ensure the continuity or
discontinuity of given cultural practices.  They are, indeed, the essential components
of empowerment in any social process.  Careful scrutiny of their availability to the
masters and servants of a cultural practice in any given case would seem, therefore,
axiomatic.  Notably requiring attention is the availability or non-availability of
particular values (or capabilities) in the absolute sense.  Often this will explain both
the intensity and the character of selected courses of action or inaction—the
enforcement (execution or maintenance) of a cultural practice, on the one hand; its
reception (acceptance or toleration), on the other—and thus the cross-cultural
deference that should or should not be extended to it.  Perhaps even more important
are the relative value positions of the masters and servants of a cultural practice since
significant disparities between them, relative to each other and to the wider community
of which they are a part, might well tip the scales of cross-cultural judgment.  It is well
known, for example, that masters of cultural practices such as family clans, ethnic and
religious groups, and governments commonly possess greater effective influence
(power) and control more resources and personnel (wealth, enlightenment, skill) than
the servants of such practices.  In such circumstances, one’s evaluative guard must be
up.  Bearing in mind the postulated public order goals of our “initial position”
decision-makers, a cultural practice that continues because those with the most
resources are able to force others to submit to it should be subject to intense scrutiny,
as in the case, for example, of caste-based social arrangements in which only “upper”
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caste members may hold positions of power and influence while “lower” caste
members are relegated to laborious jobs and poor living conditions.  The examples are
of course legion.
5.  Strategies
The strategies employed by both the masters and the servants of cultural practices
commonly embrace the whole range of instruments of policy—diplomatic, ideological,
economic, and military—that invariably are available to public and private officials.
Typically the masters will resort to some or all of them to ensure the vitality and
continuity of such practices, and the servants of them will do likewise either for the
same reasons or, alternatively, to resist their continued exercise.  Thus, because the
type of strategy employed may sometimes shape cross-cultural judgment about a given
practice and thus its acceptability within the social framework within which it is
exercised, it is useful to ask what strategies the participants employ to secure their
objectives.  For example, again recalling the public order goals postulated by our
“initial position” decision-makers, one might legitimately look askance at cultural
practices the continued maintenance of which depends upon, say, bribery and other
corrupt measures (economic instrument) or resort to the use of force (military
instrument).  However, as implied, the type of strategy employed is less relevant than
the differing degrees of coerciveness and persuasiveness with which they are
employed.  From the standpoint of the masters of cultural practices, this calls for
responsible attention to alleged abuses of power that manifest coercive or dispropor-
tionate means of enforcement.  All other things being equal, again recalling the public
order goals of our “initial position” decision-makers, practices implemented largely
through highly coercive or arguably disproportionate uses of power—examples
include amputation and stoning in the Middle East and the death penalty and solitary
confinement in the United States—should come under greater scrutiny than those that
are characterized mainly by persuasion and with all or most of the participants freely
choosing to take part in the practice in question.  From the standpoint of the servants
of cultural practices, it is well to consider the intensity of commitment or resistance to
the practice, thus to the degree of persuasiveness or coerciveness with which it is
greeted by them.  If a practice is carried out or served voluntarily, it warrants, all other
things being equal, at least prima facie deference or respect in cross-cultural decision-
making.  Likewise, if it is violently resisted, its legitimacy is in doubt.
6.  Outcomes and Effects
Perhaps most important to cross-cultural judgment about given cultural practices
are the short-term outcomes and long-term effects of the interactions between the
masters and servants of the cultural practice in question.  When all is said and done,
it is the balance sheet of net value gains and losses, both short- and long-term, absolute
and relative, resulting from the practice that commonly determines whether the
practice is to be honored or dishonored in cross-cultural judgment.  Hovering over the
balance sheet is the issue of necessity—the necessity of the value losses relative to the
gains for cultural diversity or pluralism.  
The following kinds of  “outcome” questions are thus exceedingly pertinent:
Does the continued exercise of the practice spell a “win-win” outcome for the
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participants involved?  A “win-lose” outcome?  If the latter, who “wins” and who
“loses,” and in what ways?  In other words, if the continued exercise of the cultural
practice can be seen essentially to reflect the shared aspirations of persons engaged in
a cooperative community enterprise (a “win-win” outcome), then at least preliminary
deference should be shown that practice.  If, on the other hand, its continued exercise
may be found to benefit only a small group of “winners,” say, at the expense of a large
group of  “losers,” then a high degree of scrutiny is warranted, particularly when the
“losers” manifest distinctive “minority” identity.  Even if the masters of a cultural
practice do not intend a discriminatory result, the postulated public order goals of our
“initial position” decision-makers compel us to account for the fact of discriminatory
deprivation or nonfulfillment as such.  
As for the long-term effects of the cultural practice in dispute, which potentially
can  impact beyond the immediate participants involved, again cross-cultural decision-
making must take heed.  Suppose, for example, that the continued exercise of a given
cultural practice were to result in racially discriminatory outcomes that would spark
instability and violent uprisings in large parts of the country involved, even perhaps
beyond—as indeed occurred in pre-1990 South Africa in response to the continued
exercise of the then claimed cultural practice of racial  apartheid.74  What then?  If we
are faithful to the postulated public order goals of our “initial position” decision-
makers, then, logically, cross-cultural decision-making should look upon the practice
with skepticism.  Suppose, however, that the opposite were true, for example, that the
continued exercise of the cultural practice—say, discriminations based on merit or
basic need—were to have a net positive effect for the society in question as a whole.
Then, just as logically and based on the same criteria, cross-cultural decision-making
should display at least initial great deference.  
The point is, of course, that cultural practices can have both beneficial and
detrimental outcomes and effects relative to the postulated public order goals of our
“initial position” decision-makers.  Precise characterization of them and therefore
cross-cultural judgment about them will hinge at least in part on whether and how one
appraises their short- and long-term consequences. 
7.  General Conditions
If cross-cultural decision-making is to respond adequately to the vicissitudes of
our times, it must be made to account not only for the primary characteristics of the
particular relativist-universalist case, but also for those influential general conditions
of the larger global context within which those characteristics live.  Of course, the
wider influential context within which such decision-making operates is ever-changing.
Moreover, what may be relevant in the wider context for one relativist-universalist
controversy may not be germane for another.  Nevertheless, certain features of the
current world scene, many of them contradictory but all of them influential within as
well as beyond national borders, seem especially significant and therefore worthy of
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at least passing consideration when attempting cross-cultural judgment at the present
time:
• the United States as perhaps a declining superpower, the emergence of serious
interstate  rivalry, and thus an ambiguous geopolitical environment for global
decision-making of all kinds, fundamentally influencing, inter alia, the United
Nations and other experiments at international, cross-cultural collaboration; 
• the accelerating socio-economic “globalization” of the world, commonly on
unequal terms as between “modern” and “traditional” peoples and cultures; 
• a consequent expanding interpenetration and interdependence of the world’s
peoples and their cultures (however uneven) and simultaneous decline of state
power (the United States included); 
• increased resort to intercultural civil conflict (ethnic, religious, tribal) together
with increased even if hesitant resort to external “humanitarian intervention,”
on the one hand, and decreasing resort to major international warfare, on the
other, Iraq notwithstanding; 
• a growing fragility of national and international controls over weapons of mass
destruction and, at the same time, a marked tendency toward inter-civiliza-
tional/inter-cultural national and international terrorism (both state and non-
state) of the most violent sort; 
• a hesitant but persistent trend toward democratization and the rule of law midst
widespread disillusionment with democratic processes born of, inter alia, inter-
civilizational/inter-cultural  tensions and unrewarded experiment;
• a widening disparity in economic position between the world’s “haves” and
“have-nots” (both between and within the North and South) and simul-
taneously declining public funds for economic development, thus deepening
and expanding the culture of poverty and the formidable obstacles to progres-
sive change that inhere in it; and 
• mounting ecological emergencies of regional and global—indeed, extra-
terrestrial—dimension (climate change, for example) and hesitant support for
environmental protection and the cultures that are ecologically dependent.  
Comprehensive assessment of these and other “secondary” contextual conditions
would seek richer indication of their specific relevance to diverse cultural practices
and to the fundamental policies that are deemed pertinent in relation to them.  
D.  Projection of Future Trends in Cross-Cultural Decision
The projection of probable future developments relative to given cultural
practices—in the sense of the broad trend, not the particular instance—is an important
variable in cross-cultural decision-making for at least two reasons.  First, it can help
us see whether continuation of the practice will reveal movement toward or away from
the postulated public order goals of our “initial position” decision-makers.  If so, the
practice merits at least prima facie deference; if not, then the opposite.  Second, to
minimize the diminution of cultural pluralism where continuation of a given practice
reveals movement away from the postulated goals of our “initial position” decision-
makers, it can help creativity in the invention and evaluation of alternatives to the
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manner in which the given cultural practice is exercised, making it comport with our
postulated public order goals while simultaneously preserving its essence.  This is no
easy decisional task.  No simpleminded extrapolation of the past, it requires a
disciplined analysis of all the relevant features of the practice under scrutiny and of the
primary and secondary contextual factors that condition it.
E.  The Invention and Evaluation of Alternatives
The final intellectual task of respectful decision-making in relativist-universalist
controversies relates to the deliberate search for, and assessment of, alternatives either
to the given cultural practice itself or to the manner in which it is exercised in cases
where it may be found that the practice or, more precisely, its manner of exercise, is
at odds with the postulated public order goals of our “initial position” decision-makers.
It is the last task towards which all the preceding intellectual tasks accumulate and
therefore the one to be pursued after all of its predecessors have been credibly
exhausted.  The point is that the ultimate goal of respectful decision-making in the
relativist-universalist context is not to declare a “winner,” but, rather, to enhance the
possibility of ensuring the world’s rich diversity (cultural pluralism) while at the same
time serving the values of human dignity as defined by the postulated public order
goals of our “initial position” decision-makers. Thus, where a particular cultural
practice is found, on final analysis, to conflict with those goals in the manner of its
exercise but not necessarily in its innate purpose or social function, one would look to
encourage or reward initiatives that can make the practice consistent with the values
of human dignity embedded in the goals.  A case in point is found in the rites of female
passage and sexual purification in sub-Saharan Africa where, for generations, these
rites have been administered via female genital cutting (FGC).75  In recent times in
Kenya and the Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the focus of responsible attention has shifted
to emphasize the innate purpose of the ritual rather than the modality of its
implementation and thus to preserve the ritual and simultaneously lessen or eliminate
its severity.  To the extent feasible, respectful decision-making in cross-cultural
context should seek integrative solutions characterized by maximum gains and
minimum losses for all sides of the relativist-universalist debate; it should seek
diversity in unity. 
V.  APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
In the preceding pages, I have sought to outline in at least impressionistic fashion
the key intellectual tasks and inquiries required to serve respectful decision in
relativist-universalist contests and that are at the core of contemporary nation-building
and post-conflict reconstruction tasks.  To say that they are the key intellectual tasks
and inquiries, however, is not to say that they constitute all the study that is needed.
Additionally critical is an honest assessment of the very decision process pursuant to
which that judgment is being rendered.  As any sophisticated law student knows, who
decides what, why, when, where, and how often has as much and sometimes more to
do with the resolution of legal controversies as the facts and pertinent doctrines,
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principles, and rules themselves.  Indeed, for precisely this reason, a thorough
approach to respectful decision in the relativist-universalist context would identify and
analyze that process just as it would identify and analyze the process of decision in any
controversy—that is, not simply as just one more factor generally conditioning the
controversy, but, rather, as a separate yet intimately interrelated central part of the total
social process surrounding the controversy that merits discrete analysis in its own
right.
For reasons of efficiency and space, however, I leave this further exploration to
another day.  Suffice it here to say that questions concerning the identity, perspectives,
decisional arenas, bases of power, strategies, and other attributes that help to define
those who render cross-cultural judgments about relativist-universalist controversies
have also to be seen as conditioning factors necessarily to be taken into account if a
genuinely respectful decision is to be rendered.  The core value of respect demands at
a minimum that the process of cross-cultural decision-making itself prove its own
legitimacy when it comes to challenging, possibly eliminating altogether, a
demonstration of cultural pluralism.
In any event, one thing is certain: if one is to take seriously the proposition that
respect is “the core value of all human rights,”76 there is no escaping that cross-cultural
decision-making about relativist-universalist controversies cannot be a simpleminded
affair.  Necessarily, it must reflect the complexity of life itself, implicating a whole
series of interrelated activities and events that are indispensable to effective inquiry
and therefore to rational and respectful choice in decision.  And to this end, I therefore
join other human rights theorists and activists in advocating the importance of dialogue
across cultures and societies.77  But not only ethical or moral dialogue.  Also needed
is that kind of cross-cultural dialogue that can yield substantial detailed consensus on
the many factual and policy-oriented questions that absolutely need to be asked by all
participants engaged in nation-building—hopefully systematically in keeping with the
methodology of respect that I have urged here—so as to guarantee that the core value
of respect will be present in all relativist-universalist decision-making both within and
between states.  This Essay is offered as a modest preliminary contribution to that end.
